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A REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: AN UNFULFILLED
IDEAL FOR CITIZENS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Aaron E. Price, Sr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The right of voting for representation is the primary right by which other
rights are protected. To take away this right is to reduce a man to slavery, for
slavery consists of being subject to the will of another, and he that has not a
vote in the election of representationis in this case.'
The Preamble of the United States Constitution introduces the notion of individual rights for citizens, 2 but the Bill of Rights is the legal genesis for individual
rights. 3 The essence of civil rights is to freely and equally participate in the body
politic and public affairs in order to actively promote a preferred public policy
alternative through personal participation in the electoral process. The Framers
of the Constitution wanted to ensure the greatest availability and protection of
these individual rights. Accordingly, the Framers specified that all rights not delegated to the national government and not prohibited by the states are reserved
to the people. 4 Therefore, the Constitution represents a compact between the
national government and its citizens.
To warrant the protection and fulfillment of individual and civil rights, the
Framers intended that citizens be directly represented in the new government.
The Framers' first criterion for the new national government was for it to be a
body of powers derived from the people. 5 The delegation of this sovereign power
* J.D. Candidate 2003, David A. Clarke School of Law, University of the District of Columbia;
Deputy Editor-in-Chief, District of Columbia Law Review, 2002 - 2003; BBA 1999, University of the
District of Columbia. The author wishes to thank Professors William Robinson and Wade Henderson
(Rauh Professor of Law) of the David A. Clarke School of Law for their thoughtful suggestions and
criticisms of this comment. The author immensely thanks his wife and children for their unwavering
love, support and patience.

1 Thomas Paine, DISSERTATION ON FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT (1795).
2 U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.")
Id.
3 Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1875).
It must be conceded that there are ... rights in every free government beyond the control of the
State.... There are limitations on [governmental] power which grow out of the essential nature of all
free governments. Implied reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact could
not exist, and which are respected by all governments entitled to the name.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.")
5

THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison).
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from the people to elected representatives is the republican form of national government that the Framers had envisioned. This republican form of government
equates to the modern definition and experience of democracy. Further, the Supreme Court held that the right to vote for members of Congress emanates from
the Constitution.6
During the Constitutional Convention of 1784 much deliberation was had regarding the proposed structure of the new national government. The impeding
conviction was that this new national government "should not fashion itself after
any form of representation of inconsiderable proportion nor should it fashion
itself after a favored class, or a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppression by a delegation of their powers and claim for their government the honorable title of republic." 7 Representation in the national legislature consists of an
individual's prerogative to vote directly for congressional representation in the
House 8 and the Senate. 9 Notwithstanding these prerogatives, the privilege and
right of democracy does not exist in the District of Columbia, the home and seat
of the nation's capital.1 °
It is without question that all other citizens paying federal income taxes and
claiming national citizenship enjoy the rights and benefits of elective franchise for
the national legislature. Yet, the basic elective franchise is not available for citizens of the District of Columbia. District of Columbia citizens are, after all, citizens of the United States first, then citizens of District of Columbia. 1 This
comment proposes that denial of this fundamental right is a blatant violation of
basic constitutional and civil rights. The Supreme Court has stated that "[tihe
fact that an individual lives here or there is not a legitimate reason for.., diluting
the efficacy of his vote."'12 Are there any lawful barriers to prevent enjoyment of
this fundamental constitutional and civil right and the realization of the Framers'
intent in the 21st Century? Citizens of the nation's capital find themselves in this
distressing predicament, despite the compelling American principle of a representative democracy.
Since the recognition of the District of Columbia as a separate and semi-free
entity in 1801, its citizens have been accorded disparate treatment regarding this
6 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314-15 (1941).
7 THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison).
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States .... ")
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1 ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
)
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof.....
10 Roy P. Franchino, The Constitutionality of Home Rule and National Representation for the
District of Columbia, 46 GEO. L.J. 207, 208 (1957-58).
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.")
12 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964).
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basic right.1 3 Citizens of the District of Columbia have been under varied forms
of nationally created governance in spite of apparent federalism violations. Many
of these forms of government have failed to provide for District of Columbia
representation in the national legislature. Citizens of the District of Columbia
deserve a proper and equal application of the laws, requiring a legitimate, cogently reasoned, and non-political resolution of their cause. Consequently, citizens of the District of Columbia are entitled to their constitutional guarantee of

their right to representation in the national legislature. The resultant representation will minimally produce two senators and one congressional representative in
the House.
This comment will survey possible mechanisms available for effecting the right
to representation in the national legislature for citizens of the District of Colum-

bia and recount previously employed measures and attempts. As a matter of
law, the Draconian position currently in effect results in the denial of the right to
representation in the national legislature for citizens of the District of Columbia.
Not surprisingly, this antithesis of American democracy continues to be feverishly debated and contested in political fora, while serving as a casus belli for

native Washingtonians and civil and suffrage rights activists. The United States
Congress is currently considering this oddity through identically proposed bills in
the House 14 and Senate. 15 This exact matter was before the United States Dis-

trict Court for the District of Columbia in 2000.16 A special three-judge (trial)
court was convened to hear the case. 17 The result of the trial was not favorable
for District of Columbia citizens. Nonetheless Judge Oberdorfer wrote a well
reasoned dissent in support of limited representation. The Supreme Court by
mandatory review 1 8 affirmed the decision of the lower court without opinion.

9

13 Lawrence M. Frankel, Comment, National Representationfor the District of Columbia: A
Legislative Solution, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1659, 1709 (1991).
Thus, even if it is conceded that District disenfranchisement was not a major problem two hundred years ago, it is today. To suggest it is not amounts to a casual dismissal of the fundamental rights
of 600,000 American citizens and constitutes an insult not only to those being deprived of a voice in
the affairs of their nation, but also to the republican principles upon which this nation was founded.
Id.
14 No Taxation Without Representation Act of 2001, H.R. 1193, 107th Cong. (2001) (introduced by Delegate Eleanor Norton Holmes (D-DC), Non-Voting Delegate from the District of
Columbia).
15 No Taxation Without Representation Act of 2001, S. 603, 107th Cong. (2001) (introduced by
Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), Chair of the Senate's Governmental Affairs Committee).
16 Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2000).
17 28 U.S.C. §2284(a) (1948) provides that "[a] district court of three-judges shall be convened
• . . when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of apportionment of congressional
district."
18 28 U.S.C. §1253 (1948) (decisions of U.S. District Courts consisting of three-judges are directly appealable to Supreme Court).
19 Adams v. Clinton, 531 U.S. 941 (2002) (per curiam).
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has reasoned that an earlier unconstitutional
action not vindicated does not render the action any less unconstitutional at a
later date.2 0 Ultimately, the Supreme Court may have to resolve this matter.2 1
The Constitution by way of the District Clause confers on Congress exclusive
legislative jurisdiction for the District of Columbia as the seat of the national
government.2 2 The clause has been bastardized in its purpose. The origin of this
clause is a 1784 session of Continental Congress in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
During this session an angry mob of rebellious soldiers outraged at actions of the
Continental Congress surrounded the building and gestured threats and taunts
against its occupants. Nevertheless, neither the city of Philadelphia nor the state
of Pennsylvania provided any protection or security for the members of the Continental Congress upon their request. During this period of consternation, the
Continental Congress recessed and subsequently reconvened for their safety in
Princeton, New Jersey. Upon their reconvening in Princeton, their deliberations
were monopolized by identifying means to provide for Congress' own safety and
security. This Continental Congress adopted a resolution providing the Continental Congress with exclusive jurisdiction over places in which Congress meets.
This language made its way to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and ultimately to the ratified Constitution.
The historical and current reasoning and application of the clause excluding
District of Columbia citizens from complete and full representation in the national legislature has been much more inclusive than originally intended in terms
of Congress' power over the District of Columbia. The historical and current
reading proposes that citizens of the District of Columbia are inhibited from participation and representation in the national legislature because of the exclusive
jurisdiction Congress maintains over the District of Columbia, ipse dixit. This
reasoning deprives citizens of the District of Columbia of their basic fundamental
civil right to full elective franchise for representation in the national body
politic.2 3
20 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, (1969).
21 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (quoting Chief Justice Marshall, "It is emphatically
the province of the judicial department to say what the law is").
22 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 ("To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over
such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States.")
23 Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 72 (D.D.C. 2000) (Oberdorfer, J., dissenting)
The plain language of the Constitution does not necessarily deny the people of the District the
right to voting representation in Congress. Neither the Seat of Government nor any other provision
of Article I addresses, much less directly precludes, congressional representation for the people of the
District. If the Framers intended to deny voting representation in Congress to inhabitants of the Seat
of Government, the Seat of Government clause was an appropriate place to say so. It does not.
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The District of Columbia has experienced intermittent involvement by the
President and Congress regarding its citizens' individual rights and political character.24 Via these political branches of government, the citizens of the District of
Columbia have been granted most basic and conventional individual franchise
rights, albeit on a piecemeal basis.25 These same two institutions, on numerous
occasions, have vacillated between favoring partial congressional representation
and no congressional representation at all for the citizens of the District of
Columbia.
This comment rests on the a priori position that citizens of the District of Columbia are being denied full and complete representation in the national legislature, presenting an aberration in the American principle of a representative
democracy. Under due process of law,26 any branch of government conducting
an exhaustive reading of the Constitution and performing a normative reasoning
consistent with the Framers' intent relative to a republican form of government
guarantee will accord District of Columbia citizens elective franchise for representation in the national legislature.
It surveys the current status, law, and doctrines that support the disenfranchisement of District of Columbia citizens. It analyzes the strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities available to proponents of complete elective franchise
for representation in the national legislature for District of Columbia citizens. It
concludes with proposals to solve the problems of misconstruing constitutional
principles and theories resulting in the disenfranchisement of citizens of the District of Columbia.
Concluding this comment are several proposals to raise awareness of the historic disenfranchisement plight of citizens of the District of Columbia and suggest
possible mechanisms to provide these citizens with their complete right of elective franchise for representation in the national legislature. Additionally, federal
case law and substantive law doctrines will be submitted to rebut and counter the
status quo ante, limited representation.

24 See THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1998-1999, 780 (1999) (showing the historical status of the District of Columbia).
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1 ("The District constituting the seat of Government of the
United States shall appoint.., electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of
Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State
.... ); Delegate to the House of Representatives from District of Columbia, 2 U.S.C.A. § 25a (1970).
26 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) ("a course of legal proceedings according to those
rule and principles which have been established in our system of jurisprudence for the protection and
enforcement of private rights").
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II

BACKGROUND

Origin of Suffrage in the District of Columbia
The District of Columbia was established by The Residence Act of 1790, which
provided that the area to become the seat of the national government be located
on ceded land portions from the states of Maryland and Virginia. 27 Both Maryland and Virginia enacted laws whereby portions of these respective states were
ceded to the United States to become the seat of the national government. The
original inhabitants of these ceded lands portions totaled approximately eight
thousand and were to be governed under the laws of the states of Maryland and
Virginia until the national government would provide for the land and its inhabitants. Maryland's legislation included a proviso for continued jurisdiction over
the land it was to cede and its inhabitants until Congress accepted the cession and
began providing government for the ceded portion. 2 8 Virginia's cession legislation provided similar shelter for the land it was to cede and its inhabitants.2 9
Accordingly, with the cession legislation both states recognized that the inhabitant citizens would continue to be governed by their respective existing state laws
until the national government actually moved to the District of Columbia and
began providing for the inhabitants.
The original citizens of what is now termed the District of Columbia enjoyed
complete elective franchise and representation in the national legislature. Upon
the national government's occupying of the ceded lands and providing for the
citizens of those lands through an independent District of Columbia government,
Maryland and Virginia discontinued their jurisdiction and law making for the
ceded portions. Congress did not convene in the District of Columbia until November 22, 1800. Initially, Congress authorized continued recognition of the respective states rights in the District of Columbia to calm questions of law and
jurisdiction in the new city. 30 This new city would take the form of a federal
district. 31 The lapse between 1790 and 1800 reflects the period in which citizens
of the District of Columbia enjoyed full suffrage rights and privileges through the
respective ceding states. One of these rights was the basic civil right to participate in the direct election of congressional representatives in the national legislature, both in the House and in the Senate.
27 Act Establishing the Temporary and Permanent Seat of the Government of the United
States, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 130 (1790).
28 An Act Concerning the Territory of Columbia and the City of Washington, 1791 Md. Acts
ch. 45, §2.
29 Act Cession from the State of Virginia, William W. Herring, Virginia's Statutes at Large, ch.
32, at 43 (1823).
30 An Act Concerning the District of Columbia, ch. 15, 2 Stat. 103 (1801).
31 See Black's Law Dictionary 330 (6th ed., 1991) ("it is legally neither a state nor territory").
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Upon ratification of the Constitution and through constitutional grant, Congress has exercised exclusive legislative authority over the District of Columbia.3 2
The purpose of this exclusive legislative authority was intended to ensure that the
ceding states were mindful that there would not be shared jurisdiction between
33
Since
the national government and either of the two ceding state governments.
the creation of the District of Columbia, numerous forms of government have
been enacted and repealed. There have been several attempts to provide District
of Columbia citizens with local government or management. To date, however,
only two measures have provided for participation in the national legislature.
These two measures have resulted only in limited participation privileges and
only in the House of Representatives. The varied and mixed forms of governance have ranged from local municipal government, federal commission, territorial government, quasi-state government to a federal agency.3 4
An illustrative account of the forms of governance in the District of Columbia
follows. Since the land comprising the District of Columbia had been ceded by
Maryland and Virginia, the multifarious government forms that the District of
Columbia has experienced are as follows:
*
*
*

*

35
A presidentially appointed three-member commission (1790-1802);
A popularly elected two chamber council with a presidentially appointed mayor (1802-1820);36
A popularly elected board of common council, board of alderman, and
mayor; the elected mayor was replaced by a mayor appointed by the
council and alderman 37 and subsequently the mayor being again popularly elected (1820-1871);38

A presidentially appointed governor and council along with a popularly
elected house of delegates, and for the first time a popularly elected
39
non-voting delegate to the House of Representatives (1871-1874);

32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.17.
33 Thompson v. Lessee of Carroll, 63 U.S. 422, (1859); see also District of Columbia v. John R.
Thompson, 346 U.S. 100 (1953).
34
35
States.

See notes 35 - 45 infra.
Act Establishing the Temporary and Permanent Seat of the Government of the United

36
37
38
(1820).

Act of 1802 Incorporating the City of Washington, ch. 53, 2 Stat. 195 (1802).
Act of 1812 Amending the Charter of Washington, ch. 75, 2 Stat. 721 (1812).
Act of 1820 Reorganizing the Government of the City of Washington, ch. 104, 3 Stat. 583

39 Act of 1871 Creating Legislative Assembly, ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419 (1871) (in this act, the jurisdiction and territorial government came to be called the District of Columbia and the motto "Justitia
Omnibus" (Justice for All) is adopted).
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* Another presidentially appointed three member commission (18741878);40
* Another presidentially appointed commission; this commission consisted of two civilians and one senior Army engineer officer (18781967);41
* A presidentially appointed mayor/commissioner and nine-member
council (1967-1973);42
* A non-voting delegate to the House of Representatives, independent of
43
the form of government (1970-Present);
* Home Rule, a congressional invention, providing for a popularly elected
44
mayor and city council (1974-Present);
"
and finally, a congressionally established transitory Control Board, consisting of five members appointed by the President exercising sovereign
45
authority over the popularly elected mayor and council (1995-2001).
District of Columbia Suffrage Movement
It is well documented that during the period 1790 - 1800 the original inhabitants of the District of Columbia participated in the election of representatives in
the national legislature, congressional representatives and senators via cession
acts of Maryland and Virginia.46 It was not until Congress began legislating for
the District of Columbia that the basic American civil right of national elective
franchise was violated and became non-existent.4 7
National representation for the seat of government was lightly deliberated at
the Constitutional Convention. 48 During the Constitutional Convention two ad
hominem sentiments were expressed with respect to the seat of government.
40 Temporary Organic Act of 1874, ch. 337, 18 Stat. 116 (1874) (the District of Columbia delegate to the House of Representative is eliminated from the political scene. Additionally, Congress
approved the establishment of the District of Columbia government as a municipal corporation).
41 Organic Act of 1878, ch. 180, 20 Stat. 102 (1878).
42 Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1967, 32 F.R. 11669 (1967), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. app., and in 82 Stat.
1315 (1968).
43 2 U.S.C. § 25a.
44 District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No.
93-198, 87 Stat. 777 (1973).
45 District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-8, 109 Stat. 97 (1995).
46 Peter Raven-Hansen, CongressionalRepresentation for the District of Columbia: A Constitutional Analysis, 12 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 174 (1974); Archive of Maryland, new series I, An Historical List of Public Officials of Maryland, Vol. 1, at 229, Maryland State Archives, 1990 (Thomas Beall a
resident of Georgetown during those years, an area encompassed by the newly drawn District boundaries, was a representative in the Maryland House of Delegates in 1800).
47 Peter Raven-Hansen, Congressional Representation for the District of Columbia: A Constitutional Analysis, 12 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 175 (1974).

48

3 J.

STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

(1833).
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First, Congress' right to exclusively legislate with regard to the seat of government. The aim was to provide Congress with the power to ensure for its own
protection and security via a police power.4 9 The convention's deliberators contemplated the term police power in its purest form, intending that Congress act
independently in providing their own police protection. Second, Congress' fear
that citizens in the Nation's Capital might be politically advantaged because of
their residence within the Nation's Capitol.5 0 National legislature representation
and participation on behalf of District of Columbia citizens warranted little deliberation at the Constitutional Convention. It was deduced that the citizens of the
seat of the government would retain and have voting rights rooted in their citizenship.5 1 There are no historical facts to illuminate any motives for the Constitutional Convention's deliberators' haste in addressing franchise for the seat of
government.
The District of Columbia as a body politic has been without its own representation in the national legislature since its inception in 1790, save the residual effects of the Maryland and Virginia cession provisions. There are two periods in
which limited representation has been enjoyed, April 21, 1871 through March 4,
187552 and November 5, 1971 to the present.5 3 The representation on both occasions has been in the form of a single non-voting Delegate to the House of Representatives. These two periods are diametrically opposed in terms of the
governance and status of the District of Columbia. During the first period in
which there was limited congressional representation the District of Columbia
government took the form of a territorial government. The second period is
marked by a quasi-state model of government. The distinction is quite relevant.
The territorial government operated as if it were "unincorporated" within the
United States. This "unincorporated" status in effect relegated the District of
Columbia to chattel of and belonging to the United States rather than part of the
United States. 54 Consequently, as people not part of the United States residents
49

THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).

50 The only tangible item of advantage received by the District of Columbia appears to be the
District of Columbia Emancipation Act, Compensated Emancipation Resolution, Pub. L. No. 26, 12
Stat. 617 (1862) signed by President Lincoln on April 16, 1862, nine months before the Emancipation
Proclamation. The District of Columbia Emancipation Act provided for immediate emancipation,
compensation of up to $300 for each slave to loyal Unionist masters, voluntary colonization of former
slaves to colonies outside the U.S., and payments of up to $100 to each person choosing migration.
51

THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).

52 Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress 1774 - Present at http://www.bioguide.congress.
gov/biosearchlbiosearch.asp (Delegate Norton P. Chipman, serving April 21, 1871 through March 4,
1875).
53 Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress 1774 - Present at http://www.bioguide.coigress.
gov/biosearchlbiosearch.asp. (Delegate Walter E. Fauntroy, serving November 5, 1971 through January 3, 1991 and Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton, serving January 3, 1991 - Present).
54 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (""Incorporation" of territories is a judicial
concept developed by the Supreme Court after the Spanish-American War to deal with "the difficult
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were not entitled to full representation in the national legislature. The quasistate model of Home Rule has the identical effect in its treatment of national
legislature representation. Nevertheless, the District of Columbia and its citizenry are claimed to be absolutely incorporated within the American ideal of

shared governance, without its full compliment of representation in the national
55
legislature.
Numerous unsuccessful attempts have been made to provide representation in

the national legislature for citizens of the District of Columbia. In 1846, an attempt was made, but to no avail, to retrocede the District of Columbia back to

Maryland to effect congressional representation.5 6 The land tract from the Maryland cession is all that remains from the original joint Maryland and Virginia
cession legislation. In 1846, several citizens of the District of Columbia unsatisfied with the lack of representation in the national legislature successfully lobbied for the retrocession of the Virginia land grant to revive their right of elective
national franchise.5 7 An amendment to the Constitution was submitted to the
states that would have given full and complete congressional representation for

the District of Columbia.58 This amendment contained the proposed and ratified
Constitution for the State of New Columbia. 59 It failed for lack of ratification by
60
the requisite number of states within the congressionally approved time.

In spite of the foregoing attempts, District of Columbia citizens still lack the
elective franchise for representation in the national legislature. Under its current
problem of the extent to which the guarantees of the Constitution applied to newly acquired
territories.")
55 See Id. at 260-61.
This District had been part of the States of Maryland and Virginia. It had been subject to the
Constitution, and was part of the United States. The Constitution had attached to it irrevocably.
There are steps which can never be taken backward. The mere cession of the District of Columbia to
the Federal government relinquished the authority of the states, but it did not take it out of the
United States or from under the aegis of the Constitution.
Id.
56 12 Annals of Cong. 499 (1803).
57 An Act to Retrocede the County of Alexandria in the District of Columbia, to the State of
Virginia, ch. 35, 9 Stat. 35 (1846).
58 Joint Resolution to amend the Constitution to provide for representation of the District of
Columbia in the Congress, H.R.J. Res. 554, 95 Cong. 2d Sess. (1978); see KEITH MELDER, A CITY OF
MAGNIFICENT INTENTIONS, A HISTORY OF WASHINGTON, DISTRICr OF COLUMBIA 587 (2d ed. 1997)
(the D.C. Voting Rights Amendment was to give the District the same representation in the national
legislature without any change in the city government or its authority).
59 N. COLUM. CONST. (1987).
60 See generally Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (This time requirement is not derived from
any constitutional mandate, but the Supreme Court holding that the question of the reasonableness of
the time within which a sufficient number of States must act is a political question to be determined
by the Congress. This time requirement began with the proposed Eighteenth Amendment. Congress
has customarily included this provision requiring ratification within seven years from the time of the
submission to the States.)
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structure of Home Rule, the District of Columbia continues to press onward for
complete and full representation in the national legislature. The two prominent
venues in operation are a statehood movement and judicial relief.
In spite of the struggle for participation in the elective franchise for the national legislature, District of Columbia citizens do have the right to participate in
the election of the President and Vice President of the United States.6' This right
came about as the result of a Constitutional Amendment. This was a first step in
achieving full franchise for the citizens of the District of Columbia. The grant
and acknowledgment of this basic right demonstrates the validity of the District
of Columbia and its citizenry possessing franchise rights which were not precisely
given when the Constitution was drafted and ratified over 200 years ago.
Fulfillment of a Fundamental Civil Right

The District of Columbia is currently governed under a charter granted by
Congress. 62 This current form of government provides the most democracy District of Columbia citizens have enjoyed to date. The irony of Home Rule lies in
its birth, an unequivocal all or none proposition. Congress again devised the plan
of government for the District of Columbia and then allowed the citizens of the
District of Columbia to vote upon its implementation through a local referendum. The referendum passed with a favorable vote.63 The decision involved the
continuation of a presidentially appointed commissioner/mayor and its appendages or the opportunity to have a popularly elected organic government with
separate executive and legislative functions and officers.
This quasi-state form of government provides less than complete autonomy
over local affairs with no mention of representation in the national legislature.
The lack of autonomy is particularly secured to the District of Columbia's budget
and courts. 64 The citizens of the District of Columbia have accepted Home Rule
as an interim solution while continuing to seek the full and complete national
elective franchise enjoyed by the citizens of the several states. The Supreme
Court has on occasions viewed the District of Columbia as a state. 65 More importantly, it does not and has not analogized the District of Columbia with a
61 U.S. CONST. amend XXIII, §1.
62 District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No.
93-198, 87 Stat. 777 (1973).
63 On May 7, 1974, a special referendum was held in the District of Columbia to accept or reject
the Congressionally formulated District of Columbia Charter. The vote passed with a majority of
voting citizens in the District of Columbia supporting the measure, while it was vigorously opposed by
the business community.
64 District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act §§ 302 and
303(a) (extending veto authority even to locally generated revenue).
65 See e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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territory.66 Still lacking in its fullness, the current form of government with all of
its progress and promise over the previous forms of national control and governance proves temporarily acceptable to citizens of the District of Columbia. The
lacking component is elective franchise for full congressional representation.
District of Columbia citizens are not content nor should they be with Home Rule
as the conclusion to their demand for elective franchise for representation in the
national legislature.
Solidity of Home Rule
At no point since 1800, have citizens of the District of Columbia enjoyed full
and complete national legislature representation. The Home Rule legislation
provides the District of Columbia with the general legislative authority
equivalent to the several states with few exceptions. The Congress retains legislative veto authority over all of the District of Columbia's municipal affairs and
local legislation.6 7 By analogy, the District of Columbia, having been granted the
general functions and powers of a state, should have citizens who also enjoy all of
the functions and powers of state citizens. It is undoubtedly true that the District
of Columbia is a separate political community. 68 Moreover, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Supreme Court, assented "that the District of Columbia is
a separate state, or sovereignty, being a distinct political society."' 69 The District
of Columbia is not an ephemeral subdivision of the outlying dominion of the
70
United States, but the capital and permanent abiding place of the government.
Enjoyment of full elective national franchise rights can only be assured through
an affirmative act of one of the branches of government.
III

ANALYSIS

This section details the nature, current application, and suggested reasoning of
the essential areas of law involved in the debate for the expansion of national
elective franchise for citizens of the District of Columbia.
Statutory Interpretation
The proponents of continued disenfranchisement of District of Columbia citizens premise their position and argument on the absence of an affirmative declaration within the Constitution. This argument fails because the Constitution is
not a perfect document. The Constitution with its latent defects has evolved from
66
1970).
67
68
69
70

Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); see also Virgin Islands v. Bodle, 427 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.
District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act § 601 et seq.
Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1, 9 (1889).
Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. 445, 452 (1805).
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 539 (1933).
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a humble document governing the original thirteen states to its current reach of
fifty states, eight federal territories, 7 1 and the District of Columbia. To correct
flaws and errors, the Framers included an amendment process. This process has
been successfully executed only twenty eight times.
The term "state" is not defined in the Constitution. To draw a definitive
meaning requires analysis of United States Supreme Court case law. The Court's
current interpretation selectively integrates the District of Columbia in the mean-

ing of the term "state" as expressed within the Constitution.7 2 Given this fact,
the national legislature naturally posits the District of Columbia as a state in nu-

merous enactments. 73 The thrust of this comment and suffrage activists' lies in
the chief exclusion. The chief exclusion being limited franchise and representa-

tion for citizens of the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia can be
embraced in the meaning of the term "state" as expressed in the Constitution.
This existing interpretation of selective integration is in conflict with at least
one universally accepted principle of American jurisprudence 74 and the nation's

founding principles.
The District of Columbia in its infancy once took the form of a territory75 and
has graduated to an organized body of people of considerable number and wealth
seeking to invoke all outstanding Constitutional promises. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the Connecticut Superior Court have held the

modest assessment of a state as an organization of people under its own rule of
law.76 Holdings of these two courts would bring the District of Columbia within
the realm of the meaning of the term "state." The word "state" is often used in

contradistinction to "territory," yet in its general public sense, and as sometimes
71 America Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, United States Virgin Islands, Northern Mariana Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Midway Island.
72 Hepburn, 6 U.S. at 540.
73 Jamin B. Raskin, Is This America? The District of Columbia and the Right to Vote, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 39, 97 n.271 (Winter 1999).
There are 537 federal statutes that treat the District of Columbia as though it were a State for
programmatic, governmental and constitutional purposes. See, e.g. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1994) (Federal
Election Campaign Act); 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (1994) (Fair Debt Collection Act of 1977); 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1994) (Subject Matter and Scope of Copyright); 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994) (Racketeer Influence and
Corrupt Organizations); 23 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (Federal-Aid Highways); 42 U.S.C. § 1973ee-6 (1994)
(Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped); 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-6 (1994) (Uniformed and
Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986); 42 U.S.C. § 197 3 gg-1 (1994) (National Voter Registration Act of 1993). See also D.C. Representation in Congress: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On
the Constitution of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 7-12 (1978) (testimony of Senator
Edward M. Kennedy).
Id.
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3 (1969) (defining "state" as a territorial
unit with a distinct general body of law).
75 Act of 1871 Creating Legislative Assembly.
76 Maisano v. Mitchell, 231 A.2d 539, 542 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1967); see also Delany v. Moraitis,
136 F.2d 129, 130 (4th Cir. 1943).

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

used in Federal statutes and the proceedings of the national government, it has

the larger meaning of any separate political community, including the District of
as well as those political communities, known as the
Columbia and the territories,
"states of the union.",7 7
This aspect of vindicating the right to participate in the elective franchise for
representation in the national legislature for citizens of the District of Columbia
is an exercise in constitutional interpretation. The fact that we have a written

constitution leads us to the point that the Constitution must be interpreted to
gain its full and accurate meaning.78 Interpretivisms

79

and textualism 80 tech-

niques are in effect to disenfranchise citizens of the District of Columbia. These
two techniques suggest that judicial interpretation should not venture beyond the

actual text of the Constitution and if necessary only in the most limited way.
The major premise for interpretivists and textualists is that the Constitution
does not explicitly give national elective franchise to any other organized body
other than the states. This canon of statutory interpretation and technique, Ex81

pressio unius est exclusio alterius, of interpretation is not a binding rule of law.

The Supreme Court itself has rejected this canon of statutory construction when
its application leads to inconsistency or injustice.8 2 This rigid position is unworkable in that its result is fallacious, contrary to the Framers' intent, and violative of

fundamental American political values. The starting point for any constitutional
interpretation exercise should be guided by the fundamental democratic principles upon which this nation was founded.8 3 The District of Columbia is compara-

ble to many of the several states.84 The Constitution was not meant to be a static
document. 85 To give District of Columbia citizens the national elective franchise
they qualify for and are entitled to, a more lenient interpretation is needed, in
concordance with Chief Justice Marshall's belief of an evolving Constitution to
77 Symons v. Eichelberger, 144 N.E. 279, 280 (Ohio 1924).
78 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176-78 (1803).
79 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 825 (7th ed., 1999) ("A doctrine of constitutional interpretation
holding that judges must follow norms and values expressly stated or implied in the language of the
Constitution.")
80

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1486 (7th ed., 1999) ("The doctrinal view of judicial construction

holding that judges should interpret a document or statute according to its literal terms, without looking to other sources to ascertain the meaning.")
81 Martini v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1336, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
82 Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 612 (1927).
83 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969).
84 Spencer S. Hsu, D.C. Takes Fight for Vote to the Hill, THE WASHINGTON POST, May 24, 2002,
at B1. ("More District residents have died in wars protecting the national than have residents of 20
states .... District residents pay more federal income taxes per capita ...

than 49 states .... More

Americans live in the District than in the state of Wyoming.")
85 See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) (quoting Chief Justice John
Marshall, "We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.")
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adapt to crises of human affairs.8 6 Submission to a noninterpretivism 87 method
of interpretation provides the judiciary with extra relevant sources of logic, his-

tory, natural law, and social and political policy to achieve results consistent with
the Framers' core values more than two centuries later.
Republican Form of Government
The Federal Government's guarantee of a republican form of government is

contained in the body of the Constitution within the Guaranty Clause. 88 The
republican form of government segment was intended as part of the federalism
dogma. This tenet ensures a splitting of power between the national and state

governments. The major aim was for a national government of limited powers to
work in conjunction with state governments of general powers. 8 9 The vast responsibilities and functions of state and local governments were never conceived

to be inherent in nor commuted to the national government.
The Guaranty Clause's republican form of government meaning and intent has

been lost as a result of diminutive historical references combined with scarce
scholarship in this area. Hence, the Supreme Court has viewed controversies
under this clause as non-justiciable, committing these claims to the unattainable
area of political questions. 90 Notwithstanding this circumstance, the Supreme

Court has fashioned a connotation for the term republican form of government.
The Supreme Court asserts that within the meaning of the Constitution, a repub86 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415.
87 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1077 (7th ed., 1999) ("In constitutional interpretation, the doctrine holding that judges are not confined to the Constitutional text or pre-ratification history but
must look to evolving norms and values as the basis for constitutional judgment.")
88 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.")
89 THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison)
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite. The
former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will for the most part be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the state. The operations of the Federal Government will be most extensive and important in times of war and danger; those of the State Government, in times of peace and security. As
the former periods will probably bear a small proportion to the latter, the State Governments will
here enjoy another advantage over the Federal Government. The more adequate indeed the federal
powers may be rendered to the national defense, the less frequent will be those scenes of danger
which might favor their ascendancy over the government of the particular States.
Id.
90 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 26 (1849).
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on the principle that the superior
lican form of government is one constructed
91
people.
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body
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power
The federal judiciary is constitutionally empowered to review acts and actions
92
of the executive and legislative branches of the federal government along with
opinions and orders of federal questions of state courts of last resort. 93 Questions of a political order are removed from the grasp of federal judiciary review
under the political question doctrine, as political questions are not matters commonly decided by judges. 94 A two-pronged analysis is used to determine whether
an issue falls within this doctrine. The first step involves the implication of the
separation of powers doctrine, and the second step queries the text of the Constitution for justification to refer the controversy to either the executive or legislative branch of government. The first prong bound to the doctrine of separation
of powers embodies the notion that political questions are best resolved by the
political units, the executive and legislative branches thereby averting incongrui95
ties between the federal judiciary and the coordinate branches of government.
The second question defers to the Constitution's explicit or implicit textual delegation of the controversy to a coordinate branch.9 6 Both prongs being satisfied in
the affirmative, results in the controversy being deemed a political question. Beneath these two illusive questions lie the Supreme Court's prudential judgment.
James Madison is credited as the greatest proponent of the republican form of
government. He is particularly credited with the republican form of government
guarantee being inserted in Article IV.9 7 The essence of a republican form of
government is established in the idea that the ultimate power is inherent in the
people, exercised through elected officials to execute for the benefit of the general good. 98 There are no state citizenship requirements for shelter under the
republican form of government. 99 The Guaranty Clause was written into the
Constitution and ratified nine years before the District of Columbia came into
existence. This chronological fact is the only logical explanation for the clause
exclusively containing the term "state." To assert and maintain that citizens of the
District of Columbia are not encompassed within the ambit of a republican form
of government guarantee merely because of the chronological sequence is nonsensical and an effort to avoid the substantive legal issue.
91
92
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Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 457 (1793).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 22 (rev. ed. 1937).
In re Pfahler, 88 P. 270, 280 (Cal. 1906).
Contra Eckerson v. City of Des Moines, 115 N.W. 177, 181 (Iowa 1908) (holding the guaranrepublican form of government as a guarantee to the states).
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Political questions can become justiciable through the Supreme Court's reconsidering its prudential norms. The Supreme Court has stated that when matters
of fundamental law arise, it is not bound by the common law convention of stare
decisis; the Court must review the substance and adjudicate the matter. 10 0 The
Supreme Court reasoned that an earlier unconstitutional action not vindicated
does not render the action any less unconstitutional at a later date. 10 1 District of
Columbia citizens' right to participate in the elective franchise for representation
in the national legislature is of vital import to trigger the Supreme Court's involvement in addressing this controversy as justiciable as opposed to a political
question.' 0 2 Having met the political question doctrine test, opponents of the
complete and full enfranchisement for citizens of the District of Columbia would
tacitly suggest that this is a matter of states' rights. On the contrary, the prerogative to vote for national leadership is a "right and privilege of national citizenship" and of grave significance warranting advance intervention.10 3 The
historical references and judicial holdings relating to the language of the republican form of government have concluded that this guarantee inextricably coalesces the ultimate or supreme power in the American people. Thus, citizens of
the District of Columbia are entitled to satisfaction of their constitutional guarantee, at least minimally, as citizens of the United States.
Tenth Amendment
Augmenting the Framer's intent to ensure a federalist government configuration, the Tenth Amendment was added to ensure a weaker national government. 10 4 The Tenth Amendment serves to limit Congress' power in relation to
the states.1 0 5 The significant precept of the Tenth Amendment is its limitation of
Congress' interference with a state's law-making processes. The Tenth Amendment does not explicitly or implicitly deny national legislature franchise to the
citizens of the District of Columbia. It is a foregone conclusion that Congress has
1 6
legislative power over the District of Columbia as the seat of government. 0
Under this challenge, the Tenth Amendment proves of limited utility to the citizens of the District of Columbia. Nonetheless, the task is to demonstrate that the
10 7
delegation of a general police power is contrary to the principle of federalism.
100
101
102
103

Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
Powell, 395 U.S. at 546-47.
Adams, 90 F. Supp. 2d. 72 (Oberdorfer J., dissenting).
Twinning v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 87, 97 (1908).
104 C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 267-312 (1928).
105 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the State respectively, or to the people.")
106 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76 (1982).
107 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding federalism is a check on
the power of the national government).
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Such a delegation of general power to the national government violates the principle of federalism as embodied in the Tenth Amendment.
Equal Protection Clauses

The Constitution proffers an Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment. At first reading, this amendment seems inapplicable to citizens of
the District of Columbia, as the Fourteenth Amendment is only applicable to the
states. Nonetheless, it would prove judicially unacceptable to allow the federal
government to discriminate in a manner prohibited the states by the Fourteenth
10 8
Amendment. As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Boiling v. Sharpe,
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause encompasses an equal protection
condition identical in scope to that of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme
Court concluded that requirements for challenges under either Amendment are
the same.1 0 9

Citizens of the District of Columbia are indefeasibly vested United States citizens as are the citizens of the several states. District of Columbia citizens are
similarly situated as citizens of the several states but are being denied their constitutional right of voting for and having representation in both chambers of the
has consistently held that it is unnational legislature. Yet, the Supreme Court
110
voters.
of
class
a
preclude
to
constitutional
The United States Government and its officers are subject to the equal protection requirements by the Fifth Amendment.' 11 The point of the Equal Protection
Clause is to ensure that all persons of the United States enjoy equal protection of
the laws. 1 2 Basic equal protection principles require the government, state or
national, to treat similarly situated persons equally, particularly with respect to
constitutionally based rights and privileges.' 1 3 Equal Protection Clause challenges are subject to one of three levels of scrutiny: strict, intermediate, and rational basis. The classification is dispositive of the level of scrutiny to be applied
to the situation. Under current practice, only controversies comprising the suspect classifications of race and national origin or fundamental rights justify strict
108 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
109 See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); Schlesinger v. Bullard, 419 U.S. 498.
110 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
111 See generally Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that the principles embodied by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that prohibited States from
maintaining racially segregated schools were applicable in the District of Columbia by virtue of the
Fifth Amendment due process clause).
112 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which will abridge
the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.")
113 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
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scrutiny." 4 Intermediate scrutiny is applied to controversies comprising gender,
illegitimacy, and alienage. 115 Finally, all other classifications are reviewed under
the rational basis scrutiny." 6 The strict scrutiny and rational basis review levels
are highly dispositive of the controversy. An act or statute will only survive the
strict scrutiny review when the act or statute is necessary to achieve a compelling
governmental objective and is implemented through the least restrictive
means. 117 This is the highest standard, calling for the government's objective to
be of extreme importance and the objective being furthered using the least restrictive means. Additionally, the burden of persuasion is on the government to
demonstrate the need for such legislation. On the other end of the spectrum is
the impotent rational basis standard.1 18 This standard calls for sustaining an act
or statute whenever there is any conceivable legitimate governmental objective,
and the means of implementation are rationally related to a legitimate objective
and are not arbitrary or capricious. This faint standard has great legislative deference built into it. Along the spectrum between these two polar standards lies the
intermediate review standard.' 1 9 This standard demands that the act or statute
be upheld where the government's interests are substantial and the means to further those objectives are substantially related.
The disparate treatment of similarly situated people brings this analysis within
the realm of the Equal Protection Clause. The equal protection classification in
this analysis is triggered by the classification between citizens of the several states
and citizens of the District of Columbia. 120 Considering and paralleling national
expectations of federal taxes, selective services registration, et cetera, all things
are equal; citizens of the District of Columbia and citizens of the several states
are similarly situated. The scrutiny level in this controversy is driven by the fundamental issue and demand for a right to vote. 121 It is unquestionable that the
Constitution confers the right to vote in federal elections. 122 The right to vote
has been firmly established as a fundamental right therefore requiring heightened
scrutiny for all persons with rightful connections with this country. 1 23 The onus is
114 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
115 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
116 Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1988).
117 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 416 (1997)
118 See supra note 117, at 415.
119 See supra note 117, at 415-16.
120 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) ("Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way the unnecessarily abridges that right.")
121 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-62.
122 Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 38 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
123 See generally Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see generally Reynolds, 377 U.S.
at 562. ("Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is
preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to
vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259 (1990).
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on the national government to present a compelling governmental objective for
deprecating the right to elective franchise for representation in the national legislature for citizens of the District of Columbia. With this nation being founded
upon principles of a republican form of government, there are no compelling
governmental objectives in excluding the citizens of the District of Columbia
from participation in the national legislature. 124 This component of the test provides the strongest grounds for declaration of the right of the citizens of the District of Columbia to participate in the elective franchise for complete and full
representation to the national legislature. 125 Depriving the citizens of the District
of Columbia of the right of franchise and suffrage is a most constraining method
of effecting a non-governmental objective. There being no governmental objective furthered, surely this means to effect a non-objective is not the least
restrictive.
The federal government fails on both aspects of a fundamental rights challenge
brought under the Equal Protection Clause. Provided an analysis is conducted
absent the fundamental right, the same result will ensue. There remains the obstacle of no compelling, important, substantial, or legitimate governmental interest or objective furthered by depriving citizens of the United States, namely
citizens of the District of Columbia the right to participate in the elective
franchise for national legislature representation.
Privileges and Immunities Clauses

A Privileges and Immunities Clause challenge can be used to demonstrate a
denial of an essential citizenship guarantee. The challenge is for expansion of the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause to encompass the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges and immunities jurisprudence.
The Constitution includes two Privileges and Immunities Clauses, one in Article IV,1 2 6 the other in the Fourteenth Amendment.12 7 These identically named
clauses serve two distinct purposes and protect two equally distinct groups.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV limits the ability of the
several states to discriminate against citizens of other states.12 8 The discrimina124 See generally Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337(1972) ("If a challenged statute grants
the right to vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine
whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.")
125 See, e.g., Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 101 (D.D.C. 2000) (Oberdorfer, J.,
dissenting).
126 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.")
127 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the Privileges or Immunities of citizens of the United States .... )
128 See generally Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) ("The Court reasoned "[tlhe section, in effect, prevents a State from discriminating against citizens of other States in
favor of its own.")
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tion that District of Columbia citizens seek to eviscerate originates from the national government. For this controversy the Article IV clause is of no utility to
citizens of the District of Columbia.
The identically titled clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should be made
available to the citizenry of the District of Columbia in their pursuit of representation in the national legislature. The elective franchise for representation in the
national legislature sought by citizens of the District of Columbia equates to a
fundamental privileges and immunities bearing upon the spirit of the Nation as a
single entity. 129 The outline of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities clause has not been fully exacted, but there is a basic requirement for a
fundamental right to be at issue. Justice Washington described this Privileges and
fundamental;
Immunities Clause as protecting rights "which are, in their nature,
' 130
governments."
free
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Commencing with basic constitutional law levels of review, the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privilege and Immunities Clause is subject to intermediate level
review. The government action of treating citizens of the District of Columbia
and citizens of the several states disparately with respect to the national citizenship privilege and right of participation in the elective franchise of the national
legislature can only survive upon the national government's demonstration of an
important or substantial governmental objective furthered by substantially related means. Again, based upon the nation's founding principles and the growth
of suffrage through various movements, no important or substantial reason can
be proffered. There being no valid important or substantial reason for this disparate treatment, any means used to further the exclusion of District of Columbia
franchise of the
citizens from participating fully and completely in the elective
131
national legislature surely bears no substantial relationship.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause is not absolute. Accordingly, the national government may discriminate under this Privileges and Immunities Clause only if the discrimination is substantially related to a
substantial or important governmental objective. This median test cannot be
overcome. Citizens of the District of Columbia should have this tool available in
their arsenal for vindication of their right to full and complete representation in
the national legislature.
Due Process Clauses
There are two aspects of the Constitution's Due Process Clauses. One aspect
of the clause affects material rights while the other aspect focuses upon procedural protocols. The material rights aspect limits the substantive power of govern129
130
131

Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985).
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ment to regulate various areas of human life. Hence, the name Substantive Due
Process. The other aspect reflects more closely the title of the clauses. This aspect calls for procedural correctness when a deprivation has occurred at the
hands of the government. Hence, the name Procedural Due Process. Like the
Privileges and Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses, there are two Due Process Clauses. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 132 is intended to
be applied to the national government, 133 while the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment13 1 is intended to be applied to the states. All persons
within the United States are entitled to due process protection, including citizens
35
of the District of Columbia.
A challenge to regulating the disenfranchisement of the District of Columbia
citizens' right to participate in the elective franchise of the national legislature
can be waged utilizing both substantive and procedural due process law.
Fashioning a substantive due process claim of lack of representation in the
national legislature and non-participation in the national elective franchise has to
be an issue of denial of liberty. "In the United States, the right to vote is regarded as an essential element of liberty, freedom, and self-expression.' 1 36 In
order to satisfy the liberty interest requirement, the government's deprivation of
the vote and representation in the national legislature for citizens of the District
of Columbia must be an unreasonable interference with a human right, "fundamental in the context of the process maintained by the American states. '"137 The
essence of substantive due process is grounded in an objective regimen. "[T]he
guaranty of due process law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious,
and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object
sought to be attained."'1 38 The legal standard of review for due process challenges will be strict scrutiny or rational basis. The determinative factor being
1 39
whether or not a fundamental right is at issue.
The Supreme Court has established its roster of fundamental substantive due
process rights. This list is exhaustive of the Supreme Court's apparent current
application of heightened scrutiny for substantiative due process purposes
follows:
132 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.")
133 Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833).
134 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1("... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law")
135 Wight v. Davidson, 181 U.S. 371, 384 (1901).
136 Alice E. Harvey, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisementand its Influences on the Black Vote: The
Need For a Second Look, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1145 (1994).
137 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
138 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
139 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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Right to acquire knowledge,
their children,141
Parents' rights in educating and rearing 142
Individual's right to use contraceptives,
143
Related persons' right to live together,
144
Individual's right to marry,
145
Biological fathers' rights,
1 46
Individual's right to decline unwanted medical procedures.
Citizens of the District of Columbia are squarely on the grounds of a denied
liberty interest. Realizing that the right to vote for representation in the national
legislature is not analogous to any one of the above detailed rights associated
with personal privacy and liberty warrants the expansion of fundamental rights to
include the venerated prerogative of national elective franchise for all citizens.
Agreeing with the Warren Court's ideal of the denied liberty interest being fundamental in the context of the processes maintained by the American states,
"[n]o right is more precious [and fundamental] in a free country than that of
having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good
citizens, we must live." 147 Not only is national franchise and representation in

the national legislature a fundamental right, it is a liberty interest. Should the
Supreme Court adopt the right to the elective franchise in the national legislature
as a fundamental right, a strict scrutiny analysis is to be conducted. The inevitable result of defeat attained by the strict scrutiny review is unsurprisingly the
same as that of the currently employed rational basis review. Having established
a liberty interest, the next task is to review the disenfranchisement under a rational review standard. This test being unduly lenient still defeats a claim for
reasons mentioned above relating to the complete lack of a governmental
objective.
Under a substantive due process challenge, citizens of the District of Columbia
would also prevail for the arbitrariness14 8 of their exclusion from the elective
franchise for representation in the national legislature. No intelligible principle
exists for the establishment of two classes of American citizens, the first class
140 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
141 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
142 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
143 Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
144 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
145 See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) ("Although an unwed father's
biological link to his child does not, in an of itself, guarantee him a constitutional stake in his relationship with that child, such a link combined with a substantial parent-child relationship will do so.")
146 Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
147 See generally Wesberry, at 17 (invalidating malapportioned state legislature districts).
148 Black's Law Dictionary 69 (6th ed., 1991).
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being citizens of the several states and the second class being citizens of the District of Columbia.
The national government's continued deprivation of District of Columbia citizens' right of elective franchise for representation in the national legislature without proper formalities is a denial of procedural due process.
Surprisingly, there is no general rule that the government must act uprightly
and circumspectly. The government is only compelled to act credibly using
proper procedural mechanisms when the government has committed a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Deprivation of life is a categorically unambiguous proposition. Deprivation questions are typically centered around property
and liberty. Property deprivations are easily identified by traditional state property laws. Liberty deprivation are not so easily cataloged. For procedural due
process doctrinal purposes, traditional liberty interests suffice. Additionally, to
satisfy the property interest requirement, a property interest can be shown
through the present enjoyment and legitimate claim of entitlement to a public
benefit evinced through informal practices and customs.14 9 Likewise, the Court
in Roth declared a liberty interest is raised where "those privileges long recognized.., as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men" are generally possessed. 150
Establishing the deprivation or impairment of a
constitutionally protected life, liberty, or property interest provokes the entitlement to proper procedure. The procedure or procedures to be afforded are addressed through a balancing test. An illustration of the balancing test purports
the private interest at stake for the individual (loss to individual without the additional procedural mechanism) multiplied by the likelihood that an error will be
reduced by providing the additional procedural mechanisms compared to the
151
costs of granting the additional procedural mechanism.
The original property interests (voting and representation) vested in and with
those original citizens to be passed down to subsequent and ultimately the current citizens of the District of Columbia. There is no historical proof or confirmation of the volitional waiving or extinguishing of this essential right. 152 The
original citizens of the District of Columbia enjoyed the right of elective franchise
for representation in the national legislature. 153 This right has not been and is
not capable of being waived.' 5 4 The Supreme Court has stated that an individual's constitutionally protected right to vote cannot be denied even by a vote of a
149 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
150 Id. at 572.
151 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
152 Contra Loughboro v. Blake, 18 U.S. 317, 324 (1820).
153 Peter Raven-Hansen, CongressionalRepresentation for the Districtof Columbia: A Constitutional Analysis, 12 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 174 (1974).
154 O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 540 (1933).
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majority of a state's electorate. 1 55 Likewise, Congress as the "super-legislature"
for the District of Columbia is precluded from extinguishing this right. The current deprivation of this previously enjoyed right without a valid waiver equates to
a governmental deprivation of a property right which triggers procedural due
process recompense. "Given the weight of the private interest at stake, the social
56
District of Columbia citizens are enticost of even occasional error is sizable.'
tled to a procedure that will balance the inequities of living under a national
government which does not have representatives of its citizenry, amplified by the
continued subjection to national government actions that affect the citizenry of
the District of Columbia without full and complete input compared to the administrative costs of adding two new senators and reappointment of minimally two
representatives in the House of Representatives.
In terms of outlays, the addition of two new senate seats for the District of
Columbia will bring the total to 102, giving the District of Columbia less than
two percent of the total voting strength. The Congress is currently authorized
435 members, according to statute. 15 7 The 435 congressional districts are apportioned based upon decennial census figures. The District of Columbia will gain at
least one Congressional Representative and an area decreasing in population will
lose one, a zero net effect. Whatever the forum, the procedural discovery will
yield that national legislature representation for the District of Columbia is
obligatory.
IV

PROPOSALS

These proposals are submitted to counter the current disenfranchisement of
the citizens of the District of Columbia and to effectuate the desired goal of affording the District of Columbia its own cadre of voting congressional representatives. To achieve the goal of full and complete representation in the national
legislature, a combination of these proposals may need to be initiated concurrently. The presentation and discussion of these proposals serves as a launchpad
for further development and strategic implementation.
Statehood
District of Columbia citizens must employ a six step process to effectuate
statehood for the District of Columbia. 158 The process calls for (1) a majority of
the citizens to pass a referendum exhibiting their desire for statehood; (2) election of representatives or delegates to a state constitutional convention; (3) citi155
156
157
158
Letter to

Lucas v. Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964).
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (quoting Justice Blackmun).
Reapportionment of Representatives; time and manner; existing, 2 U.S.C.A. § 2a (1959).
Julius W. Hobson, Six Steps to Statehood for D.C., WASHINGTON STAR, Dec. 6, 1976, at
Editor.
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zens of the District of Columbia ratifying the state constitution via a referendum;
(4) presentation of the state constitution to the United States Congress along
with a request for admission as a state; (5) Congressional deliberation of admission terms, conditions, and state boundaries; and (6) a majority vote of Congress. 1 59 A Congressional vote is sufficient to grant statehood, a simple
legislative technique.1 60 Having exacted the process, Congress via a majority
vote has the authority to admit new states into the union. 16 1 Accordingly, Congress has on various times admitted new states into the Union. "The common
theme associated with the admission of prospective states into the Union has
been: a commitment to democratic principles; resources and population similar to
existing states; and a desire for statehood. 1 62
What will the District of Columbia gain through statehood? Statehood is the
most secure means of effecting all the constitutional guarantees inasmuch as
statehood cannot be repealed or overruled. Statehood perfunctorily furnishes
two seats in the Senate1 63 and at least one seat in the House. 64
The equal footing doctrine ensures parity for newly admitted states. 165 District
of Columbia statehood anchored by the equal footing doctrine will put the District of Columbia and its citizenry on political par with the several states of the
union.16 6 The federal government is constitutionally barred from implementing
any condition that would reduce the District's status (as a new state). 6 7 Upon
statehood the representation the citizens of the District of Columbia seek could
not be hampered or conditioned by any branch or act of government.
ConstitutionalAmendment
District of Columbia citizens can gain their constitutional right to elective
franchise for representation in the national legislature through a constitutional
amendment. The constitutional amending process as presented in Article V of
159

See id.

160

STEPHEN MARKMAN, STATEHOOD

161

U.S.

CONST.
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33 (1988).

art. IV, § 3 ("New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union

162 STEPHEN MARKMAN, STATEHOOD FOR THE DIsTRICT OF COLUMBIA 69 (1988).
163 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
164 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
165 Com. of Virginia v. State of West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918) (holding when a new state is
admitted into the Union, it is admitted with all of the powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction that
pertained to the original states, and such powers may not be constitutionally diminished, impaired, or
shorn away by any conditions, compacts, or stipulations embraced in the act under which the new
states come into the Union that would not be valid and effectual if the subject of Congressional
legislation after admission).
166 United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding equal footing doctrine
applies to the political rights and sovereignty of newly created states, and not their economic or physical characteristics).
167 Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
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the Constitution is quite cumbersome.' 68 Both chambers of Congress must be
amiable to the proposed amendment (two-thirds of each chamber (66 in the Senate and 290 in the House)). 169 Should both chambers support the proposed
amendment it would be submitted directly to the states. 170 The proposed amendment must receive affirmative support, i.e., ratification of at least 38 of the 50

state legislatures. 171 This amounts to a proposition requiring a super-majority.
Additionally the ratification process must generally be completed within a con1 72
gressionally approved period or the proposed amendment shall be defunct.
This period of review by the states must be reasonable. 7 3 This method, if successful, would provide great stability or permanency effect to the elective
franchise for representation in the national legislature, simply because the same
herculean effort would be needed for its repeal. This method proves fallacious in

that it further subordinates citizens of the District of Columbia. Citizens of the
District of Columbia in effect would be soliciting equivalent United States citizens for national suffrage rights. This method of expanding suffrage has only

been attached to Black (African) Americans, 174 women, 175 District of Columbia

168 U.S. CONST. art. V.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be
valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of
three fourths of the several States, or by Convention in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be
made prior to the year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and
fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no Stat, without its Consent, shall be
deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.
Id.
169 U.S. CoNsT. art. V.
170 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. 379 (1798) ("The approval of the President is not necessary for a proposed [Constitutional] amendment.")
171 Dillion v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921) (a District of Columbia Statehood Constitutional
Amendment would be effective upon ratification of the 38th state and not proclamation by the Secretary of State).
172 Coleman, 307 U.S. at 228.
173 Dillion, at 375 (reasonable is determined by the gravity of the matter under consideration).
174 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridges by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.")
175 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIX, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.")
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Presidential and Vice Presidential electors, 1 76 and minors reaching the age of
1 77

majority.

Judicial Relief
The federal judiciary has determined that an action of this nature has standing,
1 78
surviving the Court's avoidance techniques of the nonjusticiable doctrines.
The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution is the source of, and guarantees protection for, the right to vote for members of the House of Representatives. 17 9 Accordingly, an opinion recognizing this fundamental right is within the
prerogatives of the federal judiciary and therefore may not lawfully be revised or
refused full faith and credit by the two political branches of government. 180 This
holding can be extended to the Senate. Moreover, support for this proposition
can be found in Harperv. Virginia.181 This appears to be the third most secure
form of protection available. There are two venues of retreat from this hypothesized holding. The first being a subsequent Supreme Court decision reversing
itself. This reversal of fortune is improbable based upon the doctrine of stare
decisis and more germanely the Supreme Court will risk its legitimacy. "The
Court is more vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language
or design of the Constitution.' ' 182 The second venue being subsequent federal
legislation. This deed is also improbable, for it would equate to legislative commandeering. 1 83 Additionally, the District of Columbia would have representation in the originating forum. This representation would spark self interest and
preservation motives, inciting its insolvency. Moreover, political death is almost
certain for opponents, politicians and political parties alike, supporting disenfranchisement. The major distinction between the current state of affairs and
that hypothesized is commandeering the right to vote from a people exercising it.
176 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1 ("The District constituting the seat of Government of the
United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors of
President and Vice President ....")
177 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of age.")
178 Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 40 (D.D.C. 2000).
179 Ex parte Yarborough (The Ku-Klux Cases), 110 U.S. 651, 665 (1884) ("the exercise of the
right [to vote] [for minorities and for other citizens] is guaranteed by the constitution, and should be
kept free and pure by congressional enactments whenever that is necessary").
180 Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1948).
181 38 U.S. 663.
182 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
183 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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Federal Legislation

Enacting federal legislation is almost the simplest remedy to this issue. To
effect the national elective franchise for citizens of the District of Columbia
through federal legislation involves the national legislature, the House and the

Senate developing and agreeing on an enactment and obtaining presidential approval. There appear to be no heroic obstacles to effecting the enactment in this
fashion other than the typical committee processes which mask individual accountability and obtaining the required affirmative votes needed on the floor of
each chamber for presentation to the President. The President wishing to veto
such a measure passing both chambers of Congress would be doomed to a political demise.1 84 Again the issue becomes association with disenfranchisement, an

ideal totally un-American.
Under what authority can the United States Congress legislate for District of
Columbia representation in the national legislature? Recognizing that Congress'

power are finite, 18 5 Congress may act pursuant to the Commerce Clause,' 8 6 Dis-

188
trict of Columbia Clause, 187 and section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Moreover, Congress may also legislate via the Necessary and Proper Clause to
189
effect an implied power.
The Commerce Clause avails itself as a result of the Court holding that Congress has plenary power relative to interstate commerce. 190 Congress alone is the

arbiter of what activities affect interstate commerce, 91 despite recent counterconstitutional movements. Congressional findings independent of further evidence of interstate commerce affectation are luminous of legislative judgment
that the activity substantially affects interstate commerce, even though the effect
may not be readily apparent.' 92 Courts must continue to give great deference to

Congressional findings of sufficient affectation. Nonetheless, the cumulative affect doctrine 193 and the "close and substantial relationship test" 194 of the Com184 Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 37 (D.D.C. 2000) ("None of the [defendant] parties
[William J. Clinton, 42nd President of the United States et al.] contest the justice of the plaintiff's
cause.")

185 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States, which shall consists of a Senate and House of Representatives.")
186 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3 ("To regulate Commerce ...among the Several States.")
187 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
188 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, §5.
189 McCulloch, 17 U.S. 316.
190 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
191 U.S.C.A. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl.3; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
192 See generally, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 277
(1981) ("When Congress has determined that an activity affects interstate commerce, the courts need
only inquire whether the finding is rational.");U.S.C.A. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3; United States v. Morrison, 529 United States 598 (2000).
193 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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merce Clause are sufficient to justify a decision supporting implication via the
Commerce Clause for a purely intra-"state" activity.
Congress may undoubtedly act according to the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the District of Columbia Clause. 195 Additionally, Congress may act under
its broad powers of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically acting
to protect District of Columbia citizens from invidious conduct endangering the
constitutionally protected right of representation. 196 This extensive power of
Congress has been extended to protecting persons from government conduct that
might not be unconstitutional but that could be viewed by Congress as endangering constitutionally protected rights.
Executive Order
The President of the United states is vested with the executive authority of the
nation.' 9 7 A precise demarcation of this executive power has not been established. The Court in one case delivered seven different opinions regarding executive authority.1 98 The theory of this executive authority is juxtaposed against a
categorical span. Youngstown brings forth the following different techniques for
assessing Presidential authority:
The President has no inherent or implied authority and can only act where
explicitly authorized by the Constitution or statute.1 99
The President has inherent or implied authority which is limited, to extent
the President interferes with the objective of another branch of the
200
government.
The President has inherent or implied authority which is limited only by
express Constitutional restrictions or statutes.20 1
The President has inherent or implied authority that cannot be restricted by
Congress and only limited by Constitutional violations.20 2
In spite of the Youngstown opinion, which appears to be an attempt to measure the unmeasurable, then Professor Woodrow Wilson articulated, "[The Presi194 Houston E. & W. Texas Railway Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (holding that the
commerce power allows the regulation of totally intrastate activities that have a "close and substantial" affect on interstate activity).
195 Northern, 458 U.S. 50.
196 See Memorandum from Norman Redlich, to Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson,
Tim S. Wierzbicki and Gary Johnson, 1 (Aug. 13, 2001).
197 U.S. CONST. art. II,, § 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.")
198 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
199 See id. at 587.
200 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 631-32 (Douglas, J., concurring).
201 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
202 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 688 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
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dent] has the right, in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can.., only his
capacity will set the limit. 2 0 3 The prevailing view of Presidential authority emanates from the Hamiltonian belief that executive authority is a general grant of
power subject only to exceptions and qualifications in the Constitution. a °4 The
advocated by the Madisonian cocounter position of explicitly delineated power
20 5
horts has not gained widespread acceptance.
A Presidential executive order giving and acknowledging a right to elective
franchise for representation in the national legislature is the simplest and frailest
means of accomplishing this prodigious duty. An order of this nature would fall
within the third or fourth technique listed above, thereby questioning the constitutionality of the instrument disenfranchising citizens of the District of Columbia.
Such an order appears valid, as there is no legislative act to sustain disen20 6
franchisement while there is prior legislative support for enfranchisement.
V

CONCLUSION

But for legal purposes a right is only the hypostasis of a prophecy - the imagination of a substancesupporting the fact that the public force will be brought
to bear upon those who do things said to contravene it .... No doubt behind
these legal rights is the fighting will of the subject to maintain them, and the
spreads of his emotions to the generalrules by which they are maintained;but
that does not seem to me the same thing as the supposed a prioridiscernment
2 07
of a duty or the assertion of a preexisting right.
A lesser democracy in the District of Columbia is unacceptable in view of the
radical principles of federalism, republican form of government guarantee, and
the Framers' intent to afford the most protection possible to individual rights.
Having particularized the quagmire of the lack of full and complete national legislature representation in our Nation's Capital, timely resolution is of utmost import. Provided both chambers of Congress and the Supreme Court complete an
inclusive reading of the Constitution and perform a normative reasoning of the
Framers' intent relative to a republican form of government, according District of
Columbia citizens elective franchise for representation in the national legislature
will prove to be just. Is this conundrum of prejudicing District of Columbia citizens to be perpetuated? A fortiori,failure to correct this problem challenges the
203

See

WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

205 (New

York: 1908).
204 See generally Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 115-126 (1926); United States v. CurtissWright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
205

1 Letters and Other Writings of James Madison (Philadelphia: 1865), 611-654.
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H.R.J. Res. 554.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1918).
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nation's stake and credibility in the global community as a protector of civil and
human rights.
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